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NOTES AND COMMENT
Air Law; Nuisance: Trespass.
Plaintiff owns a farm of 135 acres located near Cleveland; such
property having been acquired twenty-five years previously and had
been constantly improved so that now its value is about $115,000. The
surrounding countryside is devoted to farming and residence pur-
poses, there being no stores, factories, or any other enterprises which
create noise or attract crowds. The defendant owns a tract of about
275 acres immediately opposite on the other side of the road, such
property having been recently acquired for use as an airport and fly-
ing school. Defendant intends to erect hangars, service station, grand
stand, and a parking space for automobiles, on such land. Plaintiff
now seeks an injunction restraining the alleged trespass by airplanes
and the alleged maintenance of the airport as a nuisance. Sweetland v.
Curtis Airports Corp., 41 Fed., 929.
There are two question involved, (1) is a private airport and flying
school a nuisance, per se, (2) has the application of the ancient maxim
"He who owns the soil, own all to the heavens" fixed such property
rights in the land owner as to make flights over his lands a trespass
or nuisance.
The court held that a private airport, flying school, or landing field
is not a nuisance, per se, for such training fields are necessary to the
progress of aviation, and they can be regarded as a nuisance only if
located in an unsuitable place, 272-U. S. 365, or if operated so as to
interfere unreasonably with the comfort of the adjoining property
owners. Petition was denied because this airport was suitably located,
considering its surroundings, and the almost unanimous consent of
the other adjoining owners.
In regard to the noise resulting from the warming up of the air-
plane motors and from the general flying over the property of the
plaintiff, the court decided that it would not be of such degree as to
annoy persons or ordinary sensibilities. In fact, the noises are less
than the plaintiff might be compelled to endure from industrial plants
which might properly locate there.
The defendants, however, are restrained from allowing dust in sub-
stantial and annoying quantities to be blown in the direction of the
plaintiff's buildings when the airplanes are warming up and taking off,
for it is not necessary in the proper conduct of the airport for any
dust to arise therefrom; also, from distributing pamphlets over the
countryside from an airplane and' thereby interfering with the prop-
erty rights of the plaintiff when such pamphlets fell upon his land.
It is unnecessary to determine if the value of the plaintiff's land
decreased because of the adjoining airport, for even if the property
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did decrease in value that alone will not justify the injunction. 46 C. J.
682.
The plaintiff has been fortunate in that he has been able to enjoy
his country estate for so long a time, he must now yield to the change
and progress of the times.
In regard to the property rights of a land owner in the air over his
land, it is clear that in all legislation pertaining to such, that both
Congress and the States proceed upon the treory that a land owner has
no exclusive property in the higher air spaces. Both the Constitution
of the United States and of Ohio protect in broad terms the rights
of property, but neither contains any classification or definition of
property, any more than they reveal the contents of the word liberty.
94 U. S. 113.
What the owners property rights are, so far as air space above is
concerned, has not been declared by legislation, nor have such rights
been fixed by the courts as yet. The plaintiff relies upon the old com-
mon law maxim of "Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum." The
court cited a long list of English and U. S. cases in which reference
was made to the ancient maxim, but there were no cases which in-
volved an adjudication of property rights in the air space which would
be normally used by airplanes. It is true that the maxim has been
used as the basis for some decisions, but it is the points actually de-
cided, not the maxims, which establish the law. A maxim, said Sir
Frederick Pollock, "is a symbol or vehicle of the law so far as it
goes; it is not the law itself, still less the whole of the law, even on
its own ground."
What was the "coelum" or originally intended by the early Latin
writers? When used, it commonly referred to the lower air spaces,
or that space in which the birds fly and the clouds drift. Another
writer spoke of it as the space lying only a little above the highest
treetop. 62 Amer. Law Rev. 894.
Thus, it appears that the maxim has never been applied in cases
which fixed rights in the space traveled by airplanes, and since there
are no previous decisions which establish rules as to such, any reason-
able regulatory legislation would be constitutional, but so far no leg-
islative provisions have established any exclusive proprietary rights
in the land owner to the adjoining air spaces normally travelled by
the airplanes.
LYMAN B. GILLET.
Constitutional Law: Due Process.
"What is due process of law must be determined by the circum-
stances * * * ", said Justice McKenna in Reeves v. Ainsworth, 219
U. S. 296. In relation to taxation it has been agreed that due process
